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ARE EXTRATERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS
ON BRIBERY A VIABLE AND DESIRABLE
INTERNATIONAL POLICY GOAL
UNDER THE GLOBAL CONDITIONS OF





The collapse of Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi's government in
Iran affected-and continues to affect-much of the rest of the world. A
rash of nationalization of the investments of foreign companies accom-
panied the collapse.' U.S. diplomats were taken hostage; an
unprecedented event that may have affected the course of a presidential
election in the United States.2 Regional tension increased dramatically.3
Moreover, credible sources suggest that to this day the revolutionary
government in Iran supports terrorism throughout the world.4
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania. A.B., Harvard; J.D., LL.M., Duke. Lisa Campbell provided valuable research
assistance.
1. See David J. Bederman & John W. Borchert, International Decisions-Abrahim-
Youri v. United States, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 533 (1998) (noting that the collapse of the
government generated thousands of legal claims against Iran).
2. Richard Falk's contemporary commentary captures the nature of Iran's actions.
"Even Hitler, it is alleged, never violated the diplomatic immunity of his enemies. In fact,
one has to search the books of diplomatic history to find isolated precedents for the events of
the last few weeks in Tehran, and in each instance the challenge to diplomatic decorum came
from a source that can be credibly dismissed as 'barbarian.'" Richard Falk, The Iran Hos-
tage Crisis: Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 411, 411 (1980). While
the frustration felt by voters at the time undoubtedly affected the presidential election in
1980, it must be noted that the famed "October Surprise" theory, which suggests that persons
from the United States actually conspired with Iran to delay the release of the hostages and
thereby deliberately affected the election, has virtually no factual support and in fact is con-
tradicted by the actual evidence. See Steven Emerson, No October Surprise, AM.
JOURNALISM REV., March 1993, at 16, 16-24 (reviewing Senate and House hearings on the
"October Surprise" theory).
3. See Robin Wright, Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sum-
mer, 1996, at 161, 161 (describing the way in which the Iranian revolution "reshaped Middle
Eastern politics").
4. See Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dept. of State, Pub. No. 10321, Patterns
of Global Terrorism 1995, at 23 (1996) (describing Iran as a sponsor of terrorism). A par-
ticularly spectacular example of the degree to which Iran engages in such activity was the
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The collapse of the Suharto government in Indonesia was also felt
throughout the world, albeit in a different manner. Suharto's collapse
was economic: the value of the Indonesian rupiah fell precipitously,
Indonesia cancelled millions of dollars worth of contracts,6 billions of
dollars worth of loans will be rescheduled,7 and decades worth of
growth in Indonesia's wealth were wiped out.8 Moreover, the collapse of
Indonesia's economy contributed to a decline in most economies in the
region, which in turn has contributed to a decline in transnational in-
vestment.9
The collapse of each government occurred in different places, in
different times, and with different effects. One factor, however, clearly
played a very large role in each collapse. Both regimes were corrupt,
and both accepted bribes from foreign parties.0
creation, in 1984, of a special forces unit comprised of 2500 persons willing to undertake
suicide missions in order to spread fundamentalism throughout the Middle East and Northern
Africa. See JOHN B. WOLF, ANTITERRORIST INITIATIVES 24 (1989) (describing the creation
of the unit).
5. See Raising the Rupiah, EcONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1998, at 64 (showing that the value of
the rupiah fell from 10,000 rupiah per U.S. dollar to around 17,000 rupiah per dollar in the
month following Suharto's departure from government).
6. See Dave Lindorff, Stark Lessons from Indonesia, GLOBAL FIN., Aug. 1998, at 5
(reporting that "hundreds of major international contracts" are under review). One company
alone cancelled 152 contracts. See Indonesian Projects Cancelled, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1998, at 1 (reporting that the state oil company Pertamina cancelled contracts on 152 proj-
ects because of suspected connections to Suharto).
7. See Lindorff, supra note 6, at 5 ("most of the estimated $65 billion in loans to the
country's corporate sector are probably history, along with the bulk of another $70 billion in
government-to-government loans").
8. See Arshad A. Ahmed, Note, Introducing Asset Securitization to Indonesia: A
Method in Madness, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 823, 824 (1998) (noting that the Indonesian
stock market lost 90% of its value from June 1997 to June 1998); Bernard Estrade, Frag-
menting Indonesia: A Nation's Survival in Doubt, WORLD POL'Y J., Fall 1998, at 78
(reporting that gross national product per capita has fallen from US$1,100 to around US$
300). The collapse of the Suharto government is too recent to have generated lengthy schol-
arly commentary; a thoughtful account can be found, however, in Keith Suter, Indonesia:
The End of the Suharto Era, CONTEMPORARY REV., Sept. 1998, at 120.
9. See Russ Banhan, Companies Urged to Get Political Risk Coverage in Era of Asia
Crisis, J. COM., Feb. 23, 1998, at 6A (stating that the crisis in Asia will affect global invest-
ment).
10. See Lea Brilmayer, Altruism in the International Environment, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1, 6 (1996) (noting that U.S. support of corruption in the Shah's regime contributed to its
collapse); Nora M. Rubin, Note, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb
Corruption and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of
the OECD Recommendations and Convention for the United States, Germany and Switzer-
land, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 257, 277-78 (1998) (discussing the admission by the World
Bank that unregulated loans contributed to corruption and the collapse of Indonesia); Indo-
nesia's Endgame?, EcONOMIST, June 29, 1996, at 31 (reporting that the huge increase in
support for the opposition parties was due in part to disgust with the corruption of the Su-
harto regime).
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Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery
This paper participates in a debate concerning the desirability and
viability of extraterritorial prohibition of transnational bribery as an in-
ternational policy goal. Bribery consists of the conferral of a benefit to a
public official in exchange for abuse or misuse'of that official's office."
Transnational bribery occurs when a businessperson from one country
(the "home" country) bribes a public official of another country (the
"host" country). Although transnational bribery itself has only recently
become a significant phenomenon, bribery itself has a long and dark
history. 2
No country in the world expressly permits the bribery of its own of-
ficials. 3 At the moment, however, few nations criminalize the bribery of
foreign officials; the best known example of such a law is the United
States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.'4 Yet, this debate is not about the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and proponents of the criminalization of
transnational bribery do not necessarily wish to export the language of
that Act throughout the world.'"
Rather, the debate concerns an idea. That idea is captured in hypo-
thetical legislation that could be enacted by any country. This legislation
would state that it deals with conduct that falls within the parameters of
bribery, and that it only applies to nationals-natural or artificial-of
11. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing and defining transnational
bribery).
12. The best account of which can be found in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984).
13. FRITZ HEIMANN, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME? 4 (Transparency Interna-
tional 1994).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (Supp. I1 1997). The United States will soon be joined
by a number of other countries. Members of the Organization of American States and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have agreed to enact legislation
criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials. See OECD: Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials of the European Communities or Member States of the European
Union, 37 I.L.M. 1, 4 (1998); see also Organization of American States: Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, 35 I.L.M. 724, 727 (1996).
15. The apparent fixation on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is unfortunate for three
reasons. First, it is simply wrong to equate other laws with U.S. law. See generally, Beverly
Earle, The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recom-
mendations: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 207 (1996) (discussing differences between the U.S. law and OECD recommendations);
Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A comparison
with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 243 (1998)
(discussing differences between the U.S. law and the OAS treaty). Second, focus on the U.S.
legislation may push the discussion in the misleading direction of specific statutory language
rather than in the appropriate direction of whether such laws are a desirable global policy
choice. Third, the focus on U.S. legislation leads to a U.S.-centered perspective rather than a
global perspective; however, bribery and the control of bribery are not issues exclusively
controlled by the U.S. agenda. See e.g., Charles A. Cerami, Nations Plan Ambitious Cam-
paign to Curb Graft, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 14. (stating that Venezuela assumed the
lead role in persuading Latin American countries to adopt a treaty requiring transnational
bribery to be outlawed).
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that country or to nationals' agents or employees. 6 The law would go on
to say that because bribery is of necessity defined by the law of the pol-
ity in which bribery is alleged to have occurred, only behavior that is
considered illegal in the foreign country would be criminalized by the
hypothetical legislation. In other words, if a businessperson violated the
bribery laws of a host country, that businessperson could be tried in the
courts of his or her home country.
The idea that transnational bribery must be controlled, and the leg-
islation that could implement the idea, are in fact desirable policy
choices. Transnational bribery constitutes a significant threat to global
security. As such, its control is the right and the obligation of every pol-
ity that is able to do so.
This paper argues that global security can no longer be evaluated in
the realist terms of the sovereignty of nations, and that global insecurity
does not arise merely from a handful of relatively straightforward is-
sues.' 7 As an analytical tool, this paper turns instead to the concept of
"complex interdependence" put forward by Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye.' This paper then demonstrates how transnational bribery damages
the quality of transnational relationships, thus endangering global secu-
rity. '9 The paper concludes by examining empirical observations.
Empirically, transnational bribery has contributed significantly to global
instability.0 On the other hand, no empirical observations suggest that
extraterritorial control of transnational bribery leads to global dishar-
mony, or decreases the level of commerce or cooperation among
nations.2'
1. Global Insecurity
During the Cold War, global security arguably was predicated on
preventing a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.22 The end of the Cold War has fos-
tered a more comprehensive concept of global security. Nuclear
16. Similarly, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act only applies to "domestic concerns."
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. 1997). See also David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay
Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 178 (1995) (explicating "domestic concerns").
17. See infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 72-115 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 117-132.
22. See Desmond Ball, Controlling Theatre Nuclear War, 19 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 303, 303
(1989); Barry M. Blechman, A Minimal Reduction of a Major Risk, 44 BULL. ATOM. SCI. 44,
44-47 (1988); Ashton B. Carden, The Command and Control of Nuclear War, 252 Scl. AM.
32, 32 (1985).
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weapons, for example, are still of concern, but the concern now focuses
on the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists or rogue na-
tions.23 Indeed, the acquisition of not only nuclear weapons but also any
weapons of mass destruction by terrorists constitutes a significant threat
to global security. ' War remains a threat, but not between superpowers;
war is more likely to occur among less affluent countries.25
At the same time, the global system whose security is threatened by
these menaces has also changed a great deal. Persons and businesses
around the globe have entered into a period of unprecedented economic
integration, with little regard for national borders.26 Emerging econo-
mies are engaged in a more fundamental change, transforming their
bureaucratic and commercial institutions from their traditional inward
looking orientations toward outward-looking orientations that fit into
and welcome participants from the global economy.27 Clearly, new poli-
cies-and new legal regimes-must be devised to deal with changing
global conditions.28
Indeed, realist and neo-realist theories of international relations are
poor analytical tools with which to consider global insecurity under
23. See Fred Charles Ikle, The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age, 75 FOREIGN AFF.
119, 119-20 (1996) (noting that terrorist or rogue nation acquisition of nuclear weapons
poses a tremendous threat).
24. See Paul Mann, Mass Weapons Threat Deepens Worldwide, 144 AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH. 58, 58-61 (1996) (stating that terrorist groups and rogue nations find nuclear,
radiological, biological and chemical weapons easier to acquire after the Cold War).
25. Steven David points out that since 1945 there have been over 100 wars in "third
world" countries, and that over 19 million persons have died in those wars, as opposed to
200,000 deaths in non third world countries. Steven R. David, Why the Third World Still
Matters, in AMERICA'S STRATEGY IN A CHANGING WORLD 328, 332 (Sean M. Lynn-Jones &
Steven E. Miller eds., 1992). David concludes that "[iut is not an exaggeration to say that war
since 1945 has been essentially a Third World affair." Id.
26. See, e.g., Barbara Fliess & Anthony Kleitz, Trade Policy in 2000, OECD OBSERVER,
Apr.-May 1998, at 7 ("Perhaps the most commented-on feature of the international economy
during the last two decades has been the accelerated globalization of production and mar-
kets."); Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
429, 429 (1997) ("Globalization is one of the great forces shaping the world today."); see
also Laura B. Pincus et al., Legal Issues Involved in Corporate Globalization, 1991 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 269, 269 (noting "the unmistakable trend towards superregional and globalized
market economies").
27. See Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
229 (1999) (describing the transformation of emerging economies).
28. Adrian Hyde-Price notes that Europe "is developing distinctly new forms of inter-
national and transnational interaction, as globalisation, institutional integration,
democratization, deepening interdependence and multilateral cooperation transform the
structural dynamics of European politics. These changes to the very nature of European
international politics are generating a new security agenda in Europe, and require us to de-
velop a new paradigm for the study of contemporary international security." Adrian Hyde-
Price, The OSCE and European security, in RETHINKING SECURITY IN POST-COLD WAR
EUROPE 23, 23 (William Park & G. Wyn Rees eds., 1998).
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current conditions. Realism posits that states are the only meaningful
actors in international relations, that states are rational actors seeking
power, and that the basic organizing principle of the relations between
states is anarchy. 9 In a time when entrepreneurs are forging deep
commercial alliances with little regard for national borders, realism
stops at the border.3° In a time of sustained global cooperation, classical
realism insists on "a world of states obsessed with their power vis-A-vis
other states."3'
The realism theory of international relations is closely related to the
realism school of international legal theory, which also posits that states
are the primary actors.3 ' As is true of realism as an international rela-
tions theory, the realism theory of international law is limited and
stultifying. Indeed, Phillip Trimble's condemnation of legal realism's
"sterile positivism"33 echoes Roscoe Pound's scathing attack on positiv-
ism in international legal scholarship made several decades earlier.34
It should be noted that, consciously or subconsciously, Professor
Salbu's writings on transnational bribery reflect a realist orientation.35
Professor Salbu expresses great concern for the sensitivities of nations,
and it is in a potential discord of nations that he finds the greatest threat
to global security.36 Professor Salbu's construct has little room for
29. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and Interna-
tional Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 721-22 (1995) (describing the
tenets of realism).
30. See Stephen J. Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a
Networked Global Economy, in GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 146 (John H. Dunning ed., 1997) (describing globalization as a deep integration
across borders).
31. Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for In-
ternational Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 337-38 (1989).
32. See Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented
States and the Dilemma of Neo-Liberalism, 17 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1018 n.9
(1996) (noting that both legal and international relations realisms are state centered). See
also RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW Xii-XVii (1989) (describing the
realist school of international legal theory); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTO-
PIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 464-76 (1989) (describing
competing theories of international law, including realism).
33. See Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies,
42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 819 (1990). See also Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of Political
Context to the Nature and Functioning of International Law: An Intermediate View, in THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133, 138 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds.,
1968) (criticizing international law as a "repository of legal rationalizations").
34. See Roscoe Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, II BIBLIOTHECA
VISSERIANA 71, 87-88 (1923).
35. See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation
of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 231 (1998) ("Today's world re-
mains one of separate sovereignties. Although states may one day prove obsolete, they are
today's primary global units of analysis").
36. See id. at 257.
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communities that are not coincident with political borders,37 and has lit-
tle consideration for the myriad threats that are not the product of state
interaction.
Fortunately, both international relations theory and international le-
gal theory have broken from the limitations of realism.3" Indeed, in the
context of global security, it is instructive to revisit an early departure
from realism. Twenty years ago, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye sug-
gested that the notion of "complex interdependence" more accurately
describes certain types of international relationships than does realism39
Keohane and Nye put forward three characteristics of complex interde-
pendence. ' ° First, international relationships occur in "multiple
channels," including transstate, transgovernmental, and transnational.
4
1
Transnational relationships are those among nongovernmental actors,
such as businesspersons; Keohane and Nye's observation of twenty
years ago is even more compelling with respect to the current globalized
economy. 2 Keohane and Nye's observation with respect to multiple
channels of international relationships also underscores the fact that
states are not the only actors that must be accounted for when consider-
ing international policy.
43
Keohane and Nye note second that "[t]he agenda of interstate
relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear
or consistent hierarchy."' In other words, global or national security is
not simply a matter of accumulating power, and cooperation among
37. See id. at 252 (claiming that "moral imperialism is an ineluctable reality whenever
one sovereign entity seeks to alter or control behavior inside the borders of another.").
38. See David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law: A
Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT'L L. J. 417, 418 (1994) (describing "a dramatic increase during
the past two decades in the volume of scholarly work that aims to rethink the foundations of
international law and to respond to recent trends in political, social, and legal theory").
39. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977).
40. Id. at 24-25.
41. Id. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1980, 2002 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUES-
TIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992))
(noting that the relations of liberal states fit Keohane and Nye's description of multiple
channels).
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing globalization).
43. The contention that states are not the only actors in international relations is still a
matter of debate. For a thorough account of the debate, see Marc S. Ehrlich, Comment, To-
wards a New Dialogue Between International Relations Theory and International Trade
Theory, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 259 (1998).
44. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 39, at 25.
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international actors is enhanced due to the sheer number of issues in
which various actors may have an interest.45
Similarly, Keohane and Nye note third that the use of military force
is often inappropriate for solving important problems,46 and that military
force is not used when conditions of complex interdependence prevail
47
The corollary, of course, is that when conditions of complex interde-
pendence do not prevail, armed conflict is possible."
Keohane and Nye's theory of complex interdependence has
spawned and been subsumed by a host of theoretical discussions on re-
gime theory, institutionalism and neoliberaliSM. 4 Nonetheless, with
respect to global security, its central point remains vital. Global security
cannot be based simply on projections of force, or on economic hegem-
ony. o Ultimately, global security is assured by the quality of
relationships. Keohane and Nye can be read as suggesting that the con-
trol of nuclear weapons, the dampening of state support for terrorist
groups and popular support for insurgent groups, the quenching of ap-
petites for arms, and effective cooperation to control drug trafficking
and money laundering each is better accomplished through the creation
of complex interdependence than through projections of force or bald
assertions of national prerogatives.
45. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1026 (1991)
(noting that "[if states have numerous interrelated interests, tacit or express cooperation is
necessary on a wide range of issues.").
46. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 39, at 27-28 (using the examples of economic and
ecological issues); see also SHRI JASWANT SINGH, What Constitutes National Security in a
Changing World Order?: India's Strategic Thought, at 15, (Center for Advanced Study of
India Occasional Paper no. 6 1998), Essay prepared for The Future of Nuclear Weapons: A
U.S.-India Dialogue held by the Center for Advanced Study of India (May 1997), (postscript
added June 1998) (on file with author), ("knowledge and economics [have] overtaken the
purely military components of power[.]").
47. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 39, at 25.
48. Michael Doyle notes that while democratic states do not fight one another, nonlib-
eral states do attack liberal states. Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and the Formulation of
U.S. Strategy, in U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s 197, 200-03 (Daniel J.
Kaufman, et al., eds., 1991).
49. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Com-
peting Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 356 (1998) (noting that
the concept of complex interdependence stimulated interest in new theories of international
law); David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparative and Interna-
tional Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 551 n.4 (attributing "much of the energy" in
recent scholarship to the concept of complex interdependence); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways
to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L 259, 271 (1992) (stating that
complex interdependence "whittles away" at the traditional concept of sovereignty).
50. See MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, SMALL WARS, BIG DEFENSE: PAYING FOR THE MILI-
TARY AFTER THE COLD WAR 195 (1992) ("it has become clear that decisions affecting war,
peace, and the host of in-between positions cannot be made in isolation from domestic and
international political, economic, and social factors.").
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Keohane and Nye are in good practical company. The current and
most recent U.S. Secretaries of State each reflect the concept of com-
plex interdependence in their own policy statements." Indeed, from a
purely U.S. oriented perspective, Warren Christopher states that
"Americans will be more secure and more prosperous if democratic in-
stitutions and market, economies take hold."52 Keohane and Nye's
observations teach that the same can be said for all persons in the world.
Unfortunately, transnational bribery .endangers the quality of the
relationships that create complex. interdependence. Bribery corrodes
governmental institutions. Bribery severely distorts economies. Bribery
also erodes support for democratic reform and democratic institutions.
2. Transnational Bribery Degrades Governments,
Economies, and Support for Democracy
Global security is based in part on the quality of the relationships
among persons and organizations across political borders. Transnational
bribery significantly affects the ability of transnational actors to estab-
lish relationships in three critical areas: intergovernmental, commercial,
and democratic. Before discussing the corrosive effect of transnational
bribery in each of these areas, it is first necessary to establish that tran-
snational bribery is a pervasive problem.
2.1 Transnational Bribery
Bribery is a transaction in which a bribe-giver gives something of
value in exchange for a benefit conferred through abuse or misuse of the
bribe-taker's office.53 The distinctive element of bribery is the quid pro
51. See Madeleine Albright, American Leadership for the 21st Century: Doing What's
Right and Smart for America's Future, 8 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, March 25, 1997, at 1, 2
& 4 (stating that U.S. foreign policy has three goals: (1)fighting threats to U.S. and allies'
security, (2)increasing the global economy, and (3)promoting democracy and also noting
that "compared to dictatorships, [free nations] are far less likely to commit acts of aggres-
sion, support terrorists, spawn international crime, or generate waves of refugees."); Warren
Christopher, Statement of the Secretary of State, 5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Feb. 1994, at I
(Supp. 1994)("Building democracy and supporting market reform in the new independent
states of the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe are together a high pri-
ority and in the clear self-interest of the United States.")
52. Christopher, supra note 51, at 1.
53. See David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL.
Q. 719, 720 (1966); cf J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 417, 419 & n.10 (1967)(defining corruption as "behavior
which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains"); see also Bryan W.
Husted, Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third-
World Countries, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 17, 18-19 (1994) (describing bribery in transaction
terms).
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quo-the sense that the office is abused in exchange for the benefit. 4 In
transnational bribery, the transaction stretches across borders.
Philip Oldenburg observed two types of benefits conferred on bribe-
givers in a small agency in India: "according to rule" benefits and
"against the rules" benefits.55 According to rule benefits confer some-
thing on the bribe-giver that the bribe should have received pursuant to
the rules; the bribe-taker takes action that he or she should have taken
anyway. The abuse of office therefore occurs when the bribe-taker acts
on the bribe-giver's request before the requests of others, or when the
bribe-taker refuses to use his or her office in the absence of extralegal
payments. Common examples include matters such as routine govern-
ment approvals or the provision of basic government services. 6 Bribes
paid in order to obtain these benefits are often referred to as
"facilitating" payments.57
According to rule benefits could also include the award of a large
contract that the bribe-giver should have won even in the absence of a
bribe. Usually, however, a bribe will result in the award of a contract to
a party who should not have won-an against the rule benefit. When a
decision of this type is made, the abuse of office-usually given in ex-
change for large sums of money-involves the discretion of the public
54. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From
the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 823 (1988) ("[W]hen a briber
corruptly pays off a public official, he is paying to get some results for himself or those he
favors. He is seeking preferential treatment."); Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the
First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1350
(1994) (stating that "quid pro quo" is "the vital element of any definition of bribery"). Inter-
estingly, discussions of transnational bribery do not draw a distinction between bribery and
extortion; this paper too will treat both as bribery. See Lindgren, supra, at 823-26 (noting
that bribery occurs when the bribe giver initiates the transaction, whereas extortion occurs
when the bribe taker demands the transaction). Bribery also occurs between private parties.
See Ronald H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269,
270-74 (1979) (discussing bribery in the private sector). This paper discusses only the brib-
ery of government officials.
55. Philip Oldenburg, Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implication of an Indian
Case, 39 WORLD POL. 508, 523 (1987). Oldenburg does not use the phrase "against the
rules" benefits; he refers instead to "illegal and improper work." Id.
56. See, e.g., Husted, supra note 51, at 21 (describing bribe payments made to expedite
the issuing of drivers licenses in Mexico); Salim Rashid, Public Utilities in Egalitarian
LDC's: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency, 34 KYKLOS: INT'L REV. FOR
Soc. Sci. 448, 448-55 (1981) (describing bribe payments made to obtain telephone lines and
place overseas and domestic calls in India).
57. See A. Timothy Martin, Corruption and Improper Payments: Global Trends and
Applicable Laws, 36 ALBERTA L. REV. 416, 423 (1998) (defining and describing facilitating
payments).
58. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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official. Particularly when large sums of money are involved, this type
of bribery is often referred to as "grand corruption. 59
2.2 Transnational Bribery is Pervasive
Although many types of governmental corruption exist, 6° bribery
has become the most prevalent and prominent form.6 Indeed, some be-
lieve that bribery constitutes "the most significant problem, particularly,
though not exclusively, in trade between North and South.,
62
Given the current pervasiveness of grand corruption, one might
suppose that grand corruption has always pervaded transnational com-
merce. Indeed, bribery itself is as old as governments. 63 Those who have
worked in international commerce for long periods, however, observe
that the prevalence of large-scale transnational bribery is a recent occur-
rence:
[T]he incidence of grand corruption has increased tremendously
during the last decade. What used to concern a relatively small
number of people working in a relatively small number of
countries has now become a major South-wide problem....
[By] general consensus, there has been a tremendous dete-
rioration in the last ten years, with grand corruption becoming
the general rule, rather than the exception, in major govern-
ment-influenced contracts in the South. 64
59. See GEORGE MOODY-STUART, THE GOOD BUSINESS GUIDE TO BRIBERY: GRAND
CORRUPTION IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1 (Transparency International 1994)
(describing grand corruption).
60. For a discussion of the varieties of corruption, see SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, COR-
RUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1978).
61. See id. at 4 ("I shall always keep bribery in the analytical foreground."); Bruce E.
Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111, 113
("Bribery defined in the traditional sense, the performance of public duty in exchange for
something of personal value, is the paradigmatic instance of political corruption.")
62. Graham Wood, Ethics at the Purchasing/Sales Interface: An International Perspec-
tive, INT'L MARKETING REV., No. 4, 1995, at 7, 18. See also Nancy Dunne, Kantor Calls for
Bribery Action, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 1996, at 3 ("The commerce secretary [of the United
States] said that business leaders he had met say corruption in international trade is their
number one concern.").
63. See NOONAN, supra note 12, at 4-5 (discussing the ancient practice of bribery).
64. See MOODY-STUART, supra note 59, at 2-3. See also Konyin Ajay, On the Trail of a
Spectre-Destabilisation of Developing and Transitional Countries: A Case Study of Cor-
ruption in Nigeria, 15 DICKINSON J. INT'L L. 545, 545 (1997) (noting the recent
"astronomical" increase in levels of corruption).
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Several factors have contributed to the increase in transnational
bribery. The World Bank suggests that opaque regulatory systems com-
bined with weak enforcement institutions create an environment in
which persons are more likely to offer and public officials are more
likely to accept bribes . Patrick Glynn, Stephen Kobrin, and Moisrs
Naim suggest that "systemic political change has weakened or de-
stroyed social, political, and legal institutions, opening the way to new
abuses.66 Weak legal systems also contribute to the growth of bribery.67
It is very important to recognize, however, that the offer and supply
of bribes by investors from industrialized countries is also a significant
contributory factor.68 Ibrahim Shihata notes that "[floreign business,
especially in developing countries, often contributes to the spread of
corruption by assuming that pay-offs and connections are inevitable
facts of doing business-an attitude which often turns out to a self-
fulfilling prophecy., 69 The Speaker of the South African Parliament
provides pertinent commentary, noting "that international corruption is
often tacitly supported and actively encouraged by Western countries."7 °
65. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, at 103-04 (1997).
66. Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 8 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997). These scholars, who are each
members of the World Economic Forum's Davos Group, acknowledge that there is a greater
awareness and exposure of corruption, but also state that actual levels of corruption have
increased. Id.
67. See Daniel D. Bradlow, Foreword, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 361, 400 (1998)
("Without the rule of law, bribery and corruption will flourish, and those without the neces-
sary 'connections' will be left out in the cold.").
68. See MOODY-STUART, supra note 59, at 27 ("initially at least, a far higher share of
responsibility must rest on the tempters than on the tempted"); Beverly Earle, The United
States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendations: When
Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICKINSON J. INT'L L. 207, 221-
23 (1996) (arguing that the increase in transnational bribery is caused in part by western
companies); Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 509, 526 (1997)
(stating that western companies export the practice of bribery). Of course, these observations
are difficult to quantify or even to discuss on anything other than a general level. For an
interesting case study of corruption that specifically explicates the influence of bribe-
offering foreign investors, see Agnieszka Klich, Note, Bribery in Economies in Transition:
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 131-33 (1996) (discussing
how foreign investors spread the practice of bribery throughout Russia).
69. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Corruption-A General Review With an Emphasis on the Role
of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 461 (1997). See also, Julie Nesbit, Note, Tran-
snational Bribery of Foreign Officials: A New Threat to the Future of Democracy, 31 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1273, 1278 n.16 (1998) ("[A] large share of the corruption is the explicit
product of multinational corporations, headquartered in leading industrialized countries,
using massive bribery and kickbacks to buy contracts....")(quoting Peter Eigen, chairman of
Transparency International).
70. Anvers Versi, On Corruption and Corrupters, AFRICAN Bus., Nov. 1996, at 7
(quoting Frene Ginwalla, Speaker of the South African Parliament). Indeed, the significance
of bribe suppliers to the spread of transnational bribery is of such concern that the most
[Vol. 20:451
Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery
Quantitative estimates of the dollar amount of bribery are impossi-
ble, as neither bribe-givers nor bribe-takers are likely to disclose the
extent of their activities. It is, however, possible to estimate roughly
how much of the world's transnational commerce is affected by corrup-
tion. According to data on perceived levels of corruption as supplied by
the nonprofit group Transparency International and information on tran-
snational exports and imports as supplied by the International Monetary
Fund, at least twenty percent of the world's trade is perceived to be as
likely to involve corruption as it is not to involve corruption.7'
Transnational bribery is a pervasive and growing problem. With re-
spect to global security, transnational bribery constitutes an especially
pernicious threat, because transnational bribery degrades the relation-
ships that create complex interdependence.
2.3. Bribery Degrades the Relationships
the Create Complex Interdependence
2.3.1. Bribery Corrodes Governments
Bribery damages governments by affecting both the decisionmaking
process and by diminishing the pool of persons who make decisions.
Bribery causes government decisionmakers to ignore fundamental pa-
rameters of economic decisionmaking. "A fundamental tenet of a free
market system is that economic transactions should be based solely on
the price and quality of a product and the service provided by the
seller. ,7 2 When a decisionmaker has been bribed, however, the decision
is based not on price and quality, but instead on which supplier is able
to pay the largest bribe.73 This dysfunction occurs at both the level of
discrete transactions and at the level of administrative systems.
prominent nongovernment organization dealing with bribery plans to publish an index rank-
ing countries in terms of the frequency with which their citizens supply or offer bribes. See
Transparency International, Frequently Asked Questions 3, (visited Feb. 11, 1999)
<http://www.GWDG.DE/-uwvw/faqs97.htm>.
71. See Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the
Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 711, 776-
77 (1996).
72. Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 627, 627 (1983). See Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 213 (1994) (stating
that bribery "sabotages the free market system").
73. See M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Econ-
omy of Underdevelopment, 48 Am. J. EcON. & Soc. 441, 450 (1989). Alam notes that not
only is the quality of the good disregarded, but also that suppliers who cheat on the quality
of the good in order to pay larger bribes will be "successful" in such a transaction. Id.
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At the level of discrete transactions, bribery creates a system that
rewards those who do not fulfill the terms of a contract. In a corrupt
transaction, a contract is awarded not on the basis of quality or price or
even the likelihood that the bidder will comply with the terms of the
contract, but instead on the basis of the bribe paid.74 Thus, there is no
incentive to provide goods or services as specified in the contract; there
is, however, a compelling incentive to divert resources from fulfilling
the contract in order to pay larger bribes.7 A corrupted transaction may
appear to involve the transfer of a good or a service, but in practice the
object of the transaction is the transfer of an illicit payment.76
Bribery also affects administrative systems as a whole. As Vito
Tanzi notes, "When civil servants appropriate, for their own use, the
instruments that the government has at its disposal to influence the
economy and to correct the shortcomings of the private market, they
reduce the power of the state and its ability to play its intended, and pre-
sumably corrective, role."77
Pervasive bribery tends to drive out honest and effective bureau-
crats, leaving only the dishonest and ineffective. Indeed, in some
corrupt systems positions within the bureaucracy are illicitly sold by
superiors, thus effectively screening out those whose own integrity pre-
vents the payment of a bribe.7 9 Within a system in which bribery occurs,
74. See Bader & Shaw, supra note 72, at 627 (noting the "distort[ion of] the relationship
between price and quality" that is created by bribery).
75. Alam, supra note 73, at 450.
76. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 1 (1985)
(defining a transaction as the transfer of a good or a service "across a technologically sepa-
rable" boundary).
77. Vito Tanzi, Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets, FIN. & DEV., Dec.
1995, at 26.
78. See Omotunde E.G. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government, With
Special Application to Less Developed Countries, 28 KYKLOS: INT'L REV. SOC. Sci. 47, 57
(1975) (noting that efficient potential government employees will avoid government work
for moral reasons when corruption is pervasive); Tanzi, supra note 77, at 26 ("Some indi-
viduals will try to get jobs not in the areas in which they might use their particular ability for
productive use but in areas that provide scope for taking advantage of their special posi-
tions.").
79. See Robert Wade, The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is Not Better
at Development, 13 WORLD DEV. 467, 474-80 (1985) (describing the sale of government
positions). The existence-or even predominance-of a corrupted administrative system
must not be mistaken for evidence of cultural acceptance of bribery. A scholar who engaged
in extensive discussions of bribery with Indian businesspersons in India found that while
most admitted to having paid bribes, all expressed outrage and disgust at the practice. THO-
MAS DONALDSON & THOMAS DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO
BUSINESS ETHICS 226 (Harvard Bus. School Press 1999). Indeed, bribery is illegal in India.
See INDIAN PENAL CODE §§ 162-165 (bribery provisions); Prevention of Corruption Act § 5
(India) (criminalizing bribery); see also H.L. CAPOOR, COMMENTARIES ON THE PREVENTION
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resources are diverted from productive purposes to actions undertaken
to hide bribery. 0 Bribe-taking bureaucrats also withhold resources or
hide information in an effort to extract larger payments from bribe-
givers." Eventually, bribery can cause the persons who operate under a
corrupted agency to discount that agency altogether.1
2
In short, transnational bribery has a deleterious effect on govern-
ment institutions. Bribery fundamentally warps the decisionmaking
process of government agencies. Bribery also skews the pool of deci-
sionmakers by driving out honest bureaucrats and enticing dishonest
persons.
2.3.2. Bribery Distorts Economies
There is little question that bribery damages economies. Bribery
distorts markets in a number of ways. First, and most fundamentally,
bribery causes the system to work in a way other than the way it is sup-
posed to work. Rather than making decisions on the basis of cost,
quality or appropriateness, bribe-taking decisionmakers choose products
or services on the basis of personal gain. This incentive structure can
lead to the choice of an inappropriate supplier, or to the selection of
products, services or projects that simply are not needed. It can also
cause an economy to develop in ways that are not optimal."83
Transnational bribery also distorts relative prices. Bribery causes
excessive amounts of money to flow into a government, with no in-
crease in output by the government. Indeed, bribery is even more
OF CORRUPION ACT, 1947 iii (1981) ("Cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, com-
ing before the Courts, have been steadily increasing.").
80. See M.S. Alam, A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Applications, 48
KYKLOS: INT'L REV. FOR SOC. Sci. 419, 431 (1995) (stating "there will be a waste of re-
sources used in the cover-up of illicit activities.").
81. See Alam, supra note 73, at 449 ("bribery may impose costs because of the offi-
cial's efforts to maximize the offers of bribes" by creating false uncertainties).
82. One of the most comprehensive observational studies of bribery is that of the Irri-
gation Department in a southern Indian State conducted by Robert Wade. After several
periods of observation between 1976 and 1981, Wade concluded that virtually the entire
system was corrupt. Robert Wade, The System of Administrative and Political Corruption:
Canal Irrigation in South India, 18 J. DEV. STUD. 287, 287, 291 (1982). Among other things,
officials extracted bribes, called ayacut, from farmers for extra water or in some cases for the
water already allocated to that farmer. Id. at 314. Wade found that officials actively created
uncertainty among farmers in order to generate greater ayacut. Wade also found that the
credibility of the Irrigation Department had deteriorated to the point that farmers did not
believe warnings about impending water shortages. Id. at 314-15; see also Robert Wade,
Irrigation Reform in Conditions of Popular Anarchy: An Indian Case, 14 J. DEV. EcON. 285
(1984) (further discussing Wade's observational study).
83. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing bribery's distortion of
decisionmaking).
84. Johnson, supra note 78, at 54-55.
Spring 19991
Michigan Journal of International Law
distortionary than excessive taxes, because bribery must be carried out
in secret. This secrecy requirement enhances the distortionary effect of
bribery.85 Thus, bribery renders price-one of the fundamental pieces of
information in a market economy-less meaningful.
Bribery also reduces the incentive to complete contracts-indeed, an
effective bribe-giver will divert resources from the completion of the
contract in order to pay larger bribes; thus, the corrupt system burdens
economies with underfulfilled contracts.86 Bribery lowers the tax base if
some taxpayers pay bribes rather than taxes.87 Bribery may also divert re-
sources from infant industries, thus stunting the growth of entire sectors of
88
an economy.
Most damning is a growing body of empirical work that demonstrates
a negative correlation between perceived levels of corruption and foreign
direct investment. Paolo Mauro's statistical study of the relationship be-
tween corruption and private investment finds that "corruption lowers
private investment, thereby reducing economic growth .... The negative
association between corruption and investment, as well as growth, is sig-
nificant, both in a statistical and in an economic sense."89 In a later study,
Mauro finds that a measurable decrease in the level of corruption in a
country would raise its investment to gross domestic product ratio by al-
most four percent and the annual growth of its gross domestic product by
almost half a percent. 90
In short, transnational bribery fundamentally subverts an economy.
Bribery imposes real costs on economies. Perhaps most troubling, brib-
ery seriously impedes the ability of an economy to grow. Clearly,
bribery impedes an entire category of relationships that contribute to
complex interdependence.
85. See Andrei Schlieffer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. EcON. 599, 600
(1993) ("the imperative of secrecy makes bribes more distortionary than taxes.").
86. Alam, supra note 73, at 450.
87. See Tanzi, supra note 77, at 26. In addition to lowering the tax base, bribery thus also
raises the effective tax burden on those taxpayers that will not or cannot bribe tax authorities.
88. Id.
89. Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 683 (1995).
90. Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Ex-
penditure: A Cross-Country Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 83, 91
(Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1997). Considering the fact that the average annual growth rate in
world domestic product is between 2.5 and 3.0 percent, half a percentage point represents a
considerable improvement.
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2.3.3. Bribery Undermines Support for Democratic Institutions
Bribery is universally despised.9' The myth that bribery is acceptable
in some cultures92 has no empirical support.93 Instead, the empirical work
demonstrates that even persons who live in countries in which a great
deal of bribery occurs condemn bribery.94 Every major religion or
school of moral thought, including Buddhism, Christianity, Confucian-
ism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism and Taoism, specifically
condemns bribery. 95 Indeed, "that bribes have to be paid secretly every-
where, and that officials receiving bribes have to resign in disgrace if
the bribe is disclosed, makes clear that bribery violates the moral stan-
dards of the South and the East, just as it does in the West. 96 Given the
universal approbation for bribery, the Speaker of the South African Par-
liament again has terse words for those who continue to argue that some
cultures embrace behaviors that constitute bribery: "[A]ttributing cor-
ruption to [African] cultures is both arrogant and racist, as well as
convenient and self-serving. It says more about the culture of the North,
than our own.,
97
The socially corrosive effects of transnational bribery are straight-
forward. Bribery is illegal and socially condemned, and yet is practiced
91. See Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Social Contracts and Marketing Ethics, 63 J. MARKET-
ING (forthcoming July 1999) (discussing the universal condemnation of bribery).
92. See Noonan, infra note 92.
93. Judge Noonan, in his authoritative treatment of the subject, dismisses the myth as an
example of cultural arrogance: "[Ilt is often the Westerner with ethnocentric prejudice who
supposes that a modern Asian or African society does not regard the act of bribery as shame-
ful in the way that Westerners regard it." NOONAN, supra note 12, at 703.
94. An excellent example is a study conducted in Sierra Leone under the supervision of
Sahr John Kpundeh. Even though bribery is commonplace in Sierra Leone, eighty-nine per-
cent of those surveyed stated that bribery was doing a great deal of harm to Sierra Leone,
and ninety-seven percent suggested that reducing bribery should be a priority for the gov-
ernment. SAHR JOHN KPUNDEH, POLITICS AND CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF
SIERRA LEONE 109, 115 (1995). The author of this article has supervised a large study of
indigenous attitudes toward corruption in a particular transition economy; that study too
indicates that persons in that country condemn bribery.
95. See Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade
Organization, 28 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 305, 321-22 (1997) (citing primary sources from
each of the major religions and schools of moral thought that specifically condemn bribery).
96. HEIMANN, supra note 13, at 7. Heimann concludes the obvious: "There is no coun-
try in the world where bribery is either legally or morally acceptable." Id. See also RICHARD
T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 104 (1993) ("In
no country do high government officials openly practice and publicly justify the acceptance
of large sums of money for preferential treatment."). While the precise boundaries of what
constitutes a bribe may differ; nonetheless, the concept of bribery is universally condemned.
See also Shihata, supra note 69, at 453 ("Societies may differ in their views as to what con-
stitutes corruption, although the concept finds universal manifestation.").
97. Versi, supra note 70, at 7 (quoting Frene Ginwalla, Speaker of the South African
Parliament).
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by those in positions of authority. The ability of law creators to dispense
with the law and of bribe-givers to buy their way around the law renders
the rule of law meaningless." Ultimately, bribery "undermines the le-
gitimacy of governments, especially of democracies. Citizens may come
to believe that the government is simply for sale to the highest bidder.
Corruption undermines claims that the government is substituting
democratic values for decisions based on ability to pay.. It can lead to
coups by undemocratic leaders."99
Unfortunately, the corrosive effects of bribery on popular support
for the economic and democratic reform are not mere scholarly specu-
lation; the deleterious effects have been observed in Central and Eastern
Europe's transition to a market economy. ° Indeed, a recent report from
the World Bank indicates that corruption is one of the largest factors
causing popular resistance to market reform. 10
In short, transnational bribery threatens the creation of democratic
institutions throughout the world. In doing so, it severely limits the
abilities of persons and entities to engage in a multitude of the relation-
ships that contribute to complex interdependence.' 2
98. See Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of Corruption: The Ghanaian Experi-
ence, 88 POL. Sci. Q. 71, 79 (1973) ("The effect of corruption is to generate an atmosphere
of distrust which pervades all levels of administration."); Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based
Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of Environmental and Land Use Tech-
niques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 573 (1992) ("Why should
some individuals observe the law when others can pay to elude it? If the rule of law isn't the
rule of law, can anarchy be far behind?").
99. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 66, at 31, 45. Corruption also results in inequitable
distributions of wealth, further adding to social tensions. Id. at 44.
100. See Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Di-
rect Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 28 (1995) ("Charges of bribery and corruption can easily erode popular
support for economic reform in general, and foreign investment in particular.").
101. See Kevin Done, High Levels of Bribes Harms Pace of Growth, FIN. TIMES, June
28, 1996, at 4 (citing World Bank report).
102. Indeed, "the very factors that encourage corruption prevent any major reforms
from taking place." Werlin, supra note 98, at 84. A study of judicial reform in Latin America
found that factors related to corruption in the court system contributed to political inertia in
dealing with corruption and bribery. Edgardo Buscaglia, Corruption and Judicial Reform in
Latin America, 17 POL'Y STUD. 273, 276 (1996). Having exported bribery to developing and
emerging countries and watching as corruption degraded the economies and governments of
those countries, it is somewhat disingenuous of the industrialized countries to ask the de-
graded countries to reform themselves. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing
the exportation of bribery). National criminalization of bribery has value, but only as part of
a broad-based attack that includes the criminalization of transnational bribery. See Robert S.
Lieken, Controlling the Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POL'Y, Dec. 1996, at 55, 67-73
(describing the broad policies needed to combat transnational bribery, especially home
country criminalization).
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2.4. Transnational Bribery Degrades Transnational Relationships
Keohane and Nye's description of complex interdependence high-
light the importance of relationships at the international and
transnational level.' 3 Transnational bribery degrades the quality of these
relationships. An administration in which bribery is prevalent tends to
be composed of persons seeking bribes rather than attempting to ac-
complish other societal goals;' °4 thus limiting the complexity of
relationships with other nations and rendering the creation of those re-
lationships more difficult. Economic relations, including those among
private actors, are distorted; the relationships expressed as direct in-
vestment measurably declines.' 5 Even the democratic quality of a
corrupted nation diminishes.' 6
The degradation of a country and of the quality of its relationships
could manifests itself in several ways. First, bribery is closely associ-
ated with money laundering and other financial crimes."'O At the most
basic level, the bribes themselves must be laundered.' 8 Money launder-
ing undermines financial institutions, and thus "has a detrimental effect
in nearly every aspect of society."'9
A failure to recognize that communities are not coincident with
borders, and the concomitant failure to create laws that do not cease to
have effect at borders, further facilitates financial crimes in at least two
ways. In the first place, to the extent that most interstitial actors are en-
gaging in legitimate albeit unregulated conduct, then interstitial
malfeasors can hide their own illegitimate transactions amongst the un-
regulated legitimate transactions"" Second, a failure by major trading
103. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (relating Keohane and Nye's dis-
cussion of relations through multiple channels).
104. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
107. See David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emer-
gence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 457, 485 (1998)
(noting that money laundering is "related" to bribery); see also Bruce Zagaris, Revenge of
the Tequila: Crime Gathers Momentum in U.S.-Mexico Relations, 3 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.
1, 86 (1996) (describing prosecution of an operation that included bribery, money laundering
and drug trafficking).
108. See Lawrence L.C. Lee, Combating Illegal Narcotics Traffic in Taiwan: The Pro-
posed Money Laundering Control Act, 4 TULANE J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 189, 191 (1996)
(stating that money laundering is necessary to ensure the success of bribery). This was the
rationale behind the holding in United States v. Montoya, which upheld the money launder-
ing conviction of an official who deposited a $3,000 bribe check in a bank on the grounds
that bribes cannot be used without being laundered. 945 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991).
109. Lee, supra note 108, at 191.
110. Symposium Proposal of the Michigan Journal of International Law (January 11,
1999) (defining "interstitial actors" as "actors who neither represent nor claim to represent
an internationally recognized nation-state, yet whose reach and sophistication resemble a
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countries to regulate the behavior of their businesses while those busi-
nesses are in an emerging economy sends a message to that emerging
economy that bribery is acceptable and that therefore other financial
crimes such as money laundering or securities fraud must also be ac-
ceptable."'
The political and institutional degradations caused by bribery create
other threats to global security. In his model of the causes of terrorism,
Jeffrey Ross places grievances in a critical position.12 Grievances in-
clude exploitation, expropriation, government insensitivity, and political
dysfunction."3 Clearly, bribery falls within or contributes to such griev-
ances. Indeed, popular reaction to corruption in Indonesia has lead to a
collapse not only of the national but also local governments." 4 Some
commentators feel that if the situation degenerates further, violence
could be directed toward western institutions."5
Global security cannot be analyzed in simply in terms of the sover-
eignty of nations. A large and growing percentage of transnational
relations occur in a community that transcends political borders. To the
extent that this community does not have laws or other institutions on
nation-state (e.g., drug barons, Hamas, Cosa Nostra).") (quoting an April 1, 1998 telephone
interview with Elizabeth Rindskopf, former General Counsel of the CIA) (on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law). While Rindskopf focuses on interstitial malfeasors,
it should be noted that multinational corporations, international financial institutions, inter-
national organizations, and many other legitimate entities fit into her definition of interstitial
actors.
11. See Klich, supra note 68, at 145 (discussing message to emerging economies).
112. See Jeffrey Ian Ross, Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: To-
wards a Causal Model, 30 J. PEACE RES. 317, 321 (1993). Although not as part of formal
models, the connection between grievances and terrorism has been observed by others. See,
e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Policy-Oriented Inquiry into the Different Forms and Manifes-
tations of 'International Terrorism', in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
xv, xxiii (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) (defining international terrorism as "[a]n ideologi-
cally-motivated strategy of internationally proscribed violence designed to inspire terror
within a particular segment of a given society in order to achieve a power-outcome or to
propagandize a claim or grievance irrespective of whether its perpetrators are acting for or
on behalf of themselves or on behalf of a state"). Indeed, even when condemning terrorism
the United Nations is careful to maintain the linkage between grievances and terrorism. See,
e.g., Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Hu-
man Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms And the Study of the Underlying Causes of
Those Forms of Terrorism And Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance
and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own,
In an Attempt to Effect Radical Change, G.A. Res. 36/109, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 92d
plen. mtg., Agenda Item 114, at ?, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/109 (1981).
113. Ross, supra note 112, at 325-26. Ross divides grievances into seven categories:
ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, and social. Id. at 325.
114. See Margot Cohen, Tackling a Bitter Legacy: Reformasi Advocates in Provinces
Focus on Corrupt Officials, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 2, 1998, at 22, 22-23 (describing the
collapse attributable to reactions to corruption).
115. See Lindorff, supra note 6, at 6.
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which to structure its relationships, then the quality of those relation-
ships declines. One means of regulating the quality of these
relationships is for home countries to prohibit bribery by their nationals
without regard to whether that bribery occurs inside or outside of a
given political border.
3. Empirical Experience Supports the Control of Transnational Bribery
Although technology and economic globalization have made many
persons and businesses interstitial actors, sovereigns have not ceased to
exist." ' A concern may exist, therefore, that the control of nationals of a
home country while they are in the territory of a host country may have
deleterious effects with respect to the cooperation of nations. This con-
cern is baseless. No empirical data supports the notion that the control
of transnational bribery will anger national governments to the point
that cooperation among governments is endangered. A great deal of em-
pirical experience supports the proposition that transnational bribery
destabilizes global economic and political systems. This fact alone
militates for the control of transnational bribery.
3.1. No Empirical Evidence Suggests that the Control of Transnational
Bribery Endangers Cooperation Among National Governments
Professor Salbu claims that controlling transnational bribery will
adversely affect cooperation among nations."7 His claim is predicated
on a characterization of prohibitions of transnational bribery as an ag-
gressive extraterritorial application of domestic law-a form of "moral
imperialism"'"-and an assertion that such an extraterritorial applica-
tion will lead to dangerous political discord among nations. His
characterization grossly misconstrues the nature of prohibitions of tran-
snational bribery, and his assertion is unsupportable.
In some ways, the argument as a whole is troubling. The examples
given are often caricatures, or are given by persons with a vested interest
116. The author of this article, for example, has argued that the World Trade Organiza-
tion operates as a collection of sovereigns and must be recognized as such. Philip M.
Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
EcON. L. 851, 878 (1996).
117. Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Har-
mony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419 (July 1999)..
118. Cf. Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Pri-
vate Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 204 n.123 (1994) (discussing others who have
characterized prohibition of transnational bribery as cultural imperialism). Pines himself
dismisses the charge of moral imperialism, which he finds meritless.
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in maintaining bribery." 9 Moreover, if the examples that are provided
truly are indistinguishable from bribery, then it is because the indige-
nous culture is not capable of distinguishing gifts from bribes. Such, in
fact, is not the case.12 Finally, given the general condemnation of brib-
ery, the argument seems to defer to the basest elements of a society.
Respecting cultural differences, however, does not mean respecting only
the practices of the most corrupt level of a society.'
2
'
Criminalization of transnational bribery cannot be characterized as
officious. The criminalization of transnational bribery neither thrusts a
new set of laws into host countries nor regulates the conduct of host
country governments or citizens. In the first place, the control of tran-
snational bribery does not constitute the ubiquitous transnational
application of one set of laws. Indeed, the control of transnational brib-
ery cannot be made without reference to local law. A benefit conferred
on an official only constitutes bribery if the law dictates that the confer-
ral is bribery. If the law dictates that such a conferral is lawful, then the
conferral does not constitute bribery. It is relatively easy to produce ex-
amples of behavior that might be considered bribery in a
businessperson's home country and to ask if these behaviors would thus
be considered bribery under an international proscription. The question,
however, is meaningless and irrelevant. The real question is whether the
behavior would be considered bribery in the host country-the country
in which the businessperson is operating. Thus, far from thrusting law
into the host country, criminalization of transnational bribery actually
gives broader voice to the laws of that country.
Moreover, criminalization of transnational bribery does not dictate
the behavior of foreign government officials or other foreign entities.
The hypothetical statute described in the introduction to this paper,' 2  as
well as the actual legislation required by treaty,'23 only applies to per-
sons who are citizens or residents of the country enacting such
legislation. Exercise of this type of jurisdiction, through the nationality
119. Professor Salbu refers to, for example, a statement by the Minister of Trade of In-
donesia. Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH & LEE L. REV. 229, 276-77 (1997).
120. See Daniel Y. Jun, Note, Bribery Among the Korean Elite. Putting an End to a
Cultural Ritual and Restoring Honor, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1071, 1084-85 (1996)
("Korean people share the same moral standards as the Western culture regarding bribery.
They are equally capable of distinguishing between what is intended to be gratuitous and
what is intended to wrongfully influence another person.").
121. See Hudson Rogers et al., Ethics and Transnational Corporations in Developing
Countries: A Social Contract Perspective, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL MARKET-
ING 11, 20 (Nejdet Delener ed., 1995).
122. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (Supp. 1997).
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principle, is well established and noncontroversial in international
law " A host country cannot credibly claim offense when a home
country exercises its rights to regulate the conduct of its own nation-
als-particularly when its regulation consists merely of requiring its
nationals to obey the laws of the home country.
Similarly, the assertion that criminalization of transnational bribery
will cause global discord is unsupported-and unsupportable. In part
this is because there is not a large body of law to generate data for em-
pirical studies; the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has for
many years been the only effective law criminalizing transnational brib-
ery.' Comparison to other extraterritorially-applied criminal law is
inappropriate and unlikely to yield real insights. Antitrust law, for ex-
ample, is applied extraterritorially not on the basis of the nationality
principle but instead on the basis of the effects test. 2 6 The effects test
allows a country to extend its laws outside of its border to reach conduct
that will have a significant negative effect inside its borders, even if the
parties that the country prosecutes have no other connection to that
country. 12 7 The use of the effects test as a means for extending jurisdic-
tion-particularly with respect to antitrust regulations-does generate
controversy and hostility. 128 Comparisons between antitrust and anti-
bribery laws, therefore, are disingenuous and unenlightening.
124. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (3d ed.
1979) (discussing the nationality'principle). See also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 254 (1991); Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Ex-
traterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1217, 1241 (1992)
("It is also fairly well established that a state may regulate its residents, even when they are
acting outside of the state."); Stephen Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace. Which States May Regulate the Internet?; 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 131 (1997)
(noting that the "right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens or nationals anywhere
in the world is... noncontroversial.").
125. A Swedish law also prohibited the bribery of foreign government officials, but
was drafted in such a manner as to make it virtually inapplicable. See Michael Bogdan, In-
ternational Trade and the New Swedish Provisions on Corruption, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 665
(1979) (discussing the Swedish law). See also David R. Slade, Comment, Foreign Corrupt
Payments: Enforcing a Multilateral Agreement, 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 117, 122 n.22 (1981)
(observing that the Swedish law applied only to payments to officials of countries that them-
selves criminalized bribe payments by their own nationals to Swedish officials).
126. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Ap-
proaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 1013 (1995) (noting
that the effects doctrine justifies extraterritorial application of antitrust, securities and copy-
right law). See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796, 813 (1993)
(confirming the effects principle as the basis for extraterritorial application of antitrust law).
127. See Wilske & Schiller, supra note 124, at 132-33 (describing the effects test).
128. See id. at 132 (noting that the use of the effects principle is "a major source of
controversy in antitrust cases"). The use of the effects test is not universally accepted. Mat-
thew Goode, for example, does not even include it among the legitimate means of extending
jurisdiction outside of the territory of a state. See Matthew Goode, The Tortured Tale of
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Those who choose to ignore the differences among laws may assert
that the hostility created by the extraterritorial application of law is be-
yond debate. However, when more refined analysis of extraterritorial
law is used, the potential for host country resentment is entirely debat-
able. No wars have been fought or boycotts implemented because, for
example, U.S. entities must comply with and pay taxes according to the
U.S. federal tax code regardless of where they earn income. 2 9 The fact
that U.S. firms must comply with U.S. accounting standards no matter
where they are has not caused a great deal of consternation.130 And, most
interestingly for the purposes of this debate, even though the United
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has been in place for over twenty
years, and even though at least sixteen cases involving actions in a
dozen countries have been prosecuted under the Act,' one cannot find a
single meaningful diplomatic incident, a single war, a single trade boy-
cott, or any other tangible repercussion to the United States or to global
security as a result of the criminalization of transnational bribery. In-
deed, the one scholar who empirically evaluated responses to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act flatly contradicts any assertion of dan-
gerous international tension. In a study of Middle East governments,
Katherine Gillespie found minimal negative reaction among foreign
governments with respect to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
3 2
In sum, there is no credible evidence that the criminalization of
transnational bribery antagonizes host countries. Indeed, it would be
surprising if such evidence existed: the criminalization of transnational
bribery touches only lightly on the host country, and actually gives
voice to its own laws concerning bribery.
3.2. Empirical Observation Supports the Theory that
Bribery Destabilizes Governments
In contrast, simple observation demonstrates that bribery has a dev-
astating effect on the stability of governments. History is littered with
Criminal Jurisdiction, 21 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 411, 413-14 (1997) (listing the protective
principle, the nationality principle, the passive personality principle, and the universality
principle as means of extending jurisdiction).
129. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1999)(gross income is income from all sources worldwide).
130. See generally Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing Our Views Toward Re-
coupment and Market Power: Attacking the Antidumping/Antitrust Dichotomy Through
WTO-Consistent Global Welfare Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.L. 69 (1996) (noting that
accounting standards differ among countries).
131. See William Pendergast, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview of Almost
Twenty Years of Foreign Bribery Prosecutions, I FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REP.
102.001, 102.004 (BLI 1997).
132. See Kate Gillespie, The Middle East Response to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, CAL. MANAGEMENT REV., Summer, 1987, at 9, 12.
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examples of governments whose demise is attributable at least in part to
corruption. More recently, the governments of France, India, South Ko-
rea, Mexico, and Venezuela have experienced electoral trauma, at least
in part because of popular disgust with perceived corruption. 3  From
Asia to Latin America, leaders have been forced to resign as a result of
bribery charges."
Professor Salbu's assertions regarding global disharmony cannot
stand in the face of the real, observable instability created by transna-
tional bribery. Given the evidence, it is clear that the dangers attendant
to an unchecked growth in transnational bribery far outweigh the possi-
bility of frustration due to the extraterritorial prohibition of transnational
bribery.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the criminalization of transnational bribery in
the context of one issue: global security. The primary threat to global
security is no longer a nuclear confrontation between superpowers; the
threat is now more diffuse and is based in the behaviors of nations or
entities that do not have concrete relations with the rest of the globe.'
35
133. See Christopher Fay, Political Sleaze in France: Forms and Issues, 48 PARLIA-
MENTARY AVE. 663 (1995) (describing political turmoil in France); Sumit Granjuly, India in
1996: A Year of Upheaval, 37 ASIAN SURVEY 126, 127 (1996) (corruption investigation
launched by Prime Minister Rao resulted in Congress Party losing control in India); South
Korea's Lame Duck, ECONOMIST, Apr. 5, 1997, at 33-34 (noting that South Korea's presi-
dent is "reviled by the public" and battered by a previously amiable media over a corruption
scandal); John Bailey & Arturo Valenzuela, The Shape of the Future, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct.
1997, at 43 (attributing defeat in general elections of the PRI, which had held power in
Mexico since the 1920s, to reaction to corruption); Cardoso Furore Unsettles Markets, FIN.
TIMES, May 26, 1999, at 4 (describing impact of corruption on Venezuela).
134. See Steve Ellner, A Tolerance Worn Thin: Corruption in the Age of Austerity,
NACLAS REP. ON THE AMERICAS, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 13-16 (Venezuelan President Andres
Perez impeached on bribery charges); Larry Rohter, Ecuador: Ex-President Jailed, NY
TIMES, March 18, 1999, at A6 (ex-President Fabian Alarcon jailed on corruption charges);
Melina Selverston, The Unraveling of a Presidency, NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAS, May-
June 1997, at 11, 11-12 (Ecuadorian President Abdala Bucharam impeached on corruption
charges); At Odds With Itself: Ecuador, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 1995, at 51 (Vice-President and
economic mastermind Alberto Dahik fled country, causing "worst political crisis" in Ecua-
dor's political democratic history); The Mighty Fall in South Korea, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31,
1996 (reporting that former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, along with a
dozen aides, were sentenced to jail for bribery).
135. See Augustus Richard Norton, Nontraditional Challenges: Religion, Violence and
Change in the Third World, in U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s, supra
note 48, at 40, 41 (noting that the diffusion of power makes the Third World less stable and
more inclined to violence); see also Oumirserik Kasenov, Central Asia: National, Regional
and Global Aspects of Security, in SECURITY DILEMMAS IN RUSSIA AND EURASIA 188, 188
(Roy Allison & Christoph Bluth eds., 1998) (reporting that Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Repub-
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Indeed, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's observations are strikingly
pertinent in current global conditions. When complex interdependence
prevails, when healthy relationships on a number of issues through a
number of channels cross borders, then countries are less likely to inflict
damage upon one another.
Transnational bribery damages the quality of relationship and con-
tributes to global instability. Bribery debilitates governments, and
cripples a channel critical to transnational relations. Bribery distorts
economies, affecting the primary driver of transnational relationships.
And bribery corrodes support for democratic and market reform, thus
diminishing the number of countries in which relationships can be
formed.
It is overly simplistic to argue that home country criminalization of
transnational bribery will damage global harmony. In the first place,
such an argument mischaracterizes such criminalization. Home country
criminalization of transnational bribery does not outlaw legitimate be-
havior in the host country-it simply requires nationals of the home
country to obey the bribery laws of the host country. In the second
place, the argument is simplistic because it reduces international law
and international relations to single issues (and also harkens back to the
days of realism.) Rhetoric aside, there simply is no credible evidence
that indignation over the extraterritorial application of a law prohibiting
transnational bribery ever has or ever will rise to the level that it im-
pedes the myriad issues in which national governments have an interest
and on which they must cooperate.
On the other hand, there is abundant evidence of the devastation and
instability caused by bribery. One need look back no further than Indo-
nesia in the last year. Looking back, however, is not as important as
looking forward. Transnational bribery is a growing phenomenon,
which threatens serious damage to transnational relationships. The
criminalization of transnational bribery, by all countries, therefore is a
desirable policy choice at the beginning of the new millenium.
lic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed a security document that "considers as a major source
of potential military threat for member states of the [Commonwealth of Independent States]
the instability of the social, economic, military and political situations in a number of re-
gions").
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